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Abstract
Maintaining adequate pension levels throughout the entire retirement phase is a persistent 
challenge in old-age protection. Most public pension schemes in OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries provide for some form of 
indexation for pensions in payment. These mechanisms have been object of frequent 
revisions for different purposes, in particular across Europe. This article explores the 
social and financial policy objectives linked to standard indexation parameters in public 
pension schemes, and offers a rough taxonomy of additional factors used to modify 
traditional indexation arrangements, with a special focus on changing rules and practices 
adopted in the European Union (EU) area after the 2008 international economic and 
financial crisis. Analysis suggests that early responses were mainly driven by cost 
containment ideas, whereas more recently, a subtle shift towards adequacy-oriented 
interventions can be noticed. The article argues that restrictive pension indexation 
rules in combination with overall retrenchment of public pension provision fail to 
take into account the increasing duration of retirement and corresponding pension 
erosion. Such failure calls into question not only income security during retirement as 
a major objective of old-age pensions but also compliance with international standards 
of social security set by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) and the Council of 
Europe. More social policy research is needed in view of the increasing complexities of 
indexation rules, as shortfalls in indexation can cause significant impairment in the living 
conditions of older pensioners, predominantly women.
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Why indexation mechanisms matter
The way in which pensions in payment are indexed is an important feature of public pen-
sion systems, with fundamental effects not only on sustainability but also on long-term 
adequacy of pensions in payment. In Europe, adequacy of old-age pensions has returned 
into a major social policy concern (European Commission, 2018a, 2018b). After an 
extended period of pension retrenchment reforms which had focused almost exclusively 
on the financial sustainability of public pension systems, adequacy considerations seem 
to be gaining ground again. New emphasis is given to the effectiveness of public pension 
schemes regarding their protective functions, namely, providing income security in old 
age as well as preventing or alleviating poverty risks during retirement.
Up to a recent past, adequacy debates referred mainly to the decline of replacement 
rates of the initial pension after retirement. However, poverty risks are not only linked to 
cuts in entry pension levels. In many countries, older pensioners, in particular those aged 
75 and over, are at a higher risk of poverty and have lower incomes than younger retirees. 
This can be attributed to various social factors, including insufficient pension indexation. 
Although the indexation mechanism is a highly sensitive issue for the long-term ade-
quacy of pensions in payment and their ability to prevent poverty among older pension-
ers, indexation rules are rarely a prominent topic in social policy debates. Very few 
studies have been dedicated to indexation issues (Piggott and Sane, 2009; Whitehouse, 
2009) or explicitly included indexation rules into broader policy reform analysis (for 
some discussion, see, however, Hinrichs, 2015; Immergut et al., 2007; Natali and Stamati, 
2013). Global reform debates have centred around the parametrical and structural reforms 
prompted by the challenges of ageing societies, with a strong emphasis on the financial 
sustainability of pension systems and on systemic issues, such as the establishment of 
multi-pillar systems and the shift towards private, capital-funded pension schemes (see, 
for example, Barr and Diamond, 2009; Drahokoupil and Domonkos, 2013; Ebbinghaus, 
2015; Holzmann, 2013; Orenstein, 2011; Schwarz and Arias, 2014). Changes to indexa-
tion rules for pensions in payment – understood as an automatic adjustment of pension 
benefits to prices or wages to ensure income security throughout retirement – were often 
overlooked (Brimblecombe, 2013). The scant attention for the long-term guarantee of 
adequate pension benefits may be primarily due to a general consensus on the principle 
that benefits in payment should be indexed to some extent, and to the idea that indexation 
is a more technical issue, to be left to actuarial experts. Yet the practical relevance of 
adequate pension indexation rules for the living conditions of older pensioners and their 
income situation in view of increasing life expectancies and a tendency towards pro-
tracted pension payment terms can hardly be overestimated.
How income security is achieved and how different indexation options impact income 
security at higher ages depends to a great deal on the structure and design of the different 
national pension systems (for a description of pension systems in the European Union 
[EU], see European Commission, 2018b): Public pension schemes can be basic, flat-rate 
pensions, either means-tested or universal, providing benefits that depend on a certain 
vesting period (contributions or years of residence) and are usually financed out of gen-
eral tax revenue. They can also be organised as contributory social insurance schemes 
aimed at income replacement, so that the pension benefit depends largely on past 
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earnings and contributions. A few countries have introduced pre-funded mandatory 
schemes where contributions are invested in pension funds managed by private adminis-
trators. Occupational pension schemes as well as voluntary saving schemes where pen-
sion funds or private insurance companies pay out a lump sum or annuities at retirement 
are out of the scope of this article.
The reason why indexation issues have reappeared on the social policy agenda is 
linked to several factors. On one hand, most industrialised countries are facing persistent 
and unprecedented increases in life expectancy for men and women (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2017a: 120f; European Commission, 
2017) accompanied by more extended retirement and pension payment periods. Between 
1970 and 2014, the average duration of pensions in payment in Europe rose from 15 to 
22 years for women and from 11 to 18 years for men, with peaks of over 28 years for 
women and over 24 years for men in France and Italy (European Commission, 2018b; 
OECD, 2017a). On the other hand, European countries enacted pension reforms in order 
to improve financial sustainability in view of rapid population ageing. The sustainabil-
ity-driven pension reforms in earnings-related pension schemes cut down pension levels 
and reduced the so-called replacement rate which is defined as the initial pension 
expressed as a percentage of the last wage of the beneficiary. It is a standard indicator 
measuring which percentage of purchasing power is retained on reaching retirement. 
Pension reforms tightened eligibility conditions, for instance, by shifting the pensionable 
earnings reference to a full or close to full career parameter instead of a limited number 
of best years. Further cutbacks on the initial level of old-age pensions are due to various 
sustainability mechanisms or automatic balancing factors (European Commission, 2017: 
148), including demographic factors that tie the pension term or pension access age with 
the increases in life expectancy, for example, in Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland and 
Sweden, or with changes in the old-age dependency ratio, for example, in Germany, 
Portugal and Sweden (OECD, 2017a: 25). The overall outcomes of these retrenchment 
policies are smaller entry pensions for a growing number of pensioners. Other reform 
elements, such as raising the standard retirement age and incentives to extend working 
lives, may increase pension adequacy for some pensioners. But this barely compensates 
for the overall reduction in the scope of protection by public pension schemes.
In order to safeguard long-term adequacy of the pension benefits, lower entry pension 
levels therefore require a stricter focus on adequate indexation rules, as insufficient index-
ation bears the risk of substantial pension erosion and massive loss of purchasing power 
over time. Older pensioners aged 75 and over are at a higher risk of poverty and have 
lower incomes than younger retirees (European Commission, 2018a: 15f., 27ff.; OECD, 
2017a: 134ff.). Model calculations of the prospective theoretical replacement rates (TRRs) 
in 2066 of pensions in payment for 10 years – adjusted according to indexation rules for 
pensions currently in force – showed substantial decline in comparison to the replacement 
rates of new entry pensions (based on a standard male career), indicating dramatic tenden-
cies of pension erosion in several EU countries. The largest pension erosion, of 10 per-
centage points or more, has been projected for Portugal, Hungary, Belgium and Austria 
(European Commission, 2018a: 121).
Neglecting adequacy of pension indexation is undermining income security at older 
ages, especially among low-income pensioners as a social group of high vulnerability. 
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Whereas younger old-age pensioners may supplement a low pension by economic activi-
ties, the capacity to generate additional earned income is likely to decrease at higher 
ages, especially beyond the age of 75 or 80. Although, on average, poverty risks may 
have shifted from the old to the young, poverty rates among the elderly aged 75+ are still 
high in many countries, including Japan, Latvia, Turkey, Israel, Estonia, the United 
States, Switzerland, Australia and Mexico, with a peak of almost 60% in Korea (OECD, 
2017b: 121). In almost all OECD countries, poverty rates (defined as half of the median-
equivalised income) among the age group 76+ are higher than for the elderly aged 66 to 
75. This result is confirmed in the context of EU data which use a threshold of 60% of 
the national median-equivalised disposable income after social transfers (European 
Commission, 2018a).
The poverty risks among older pensioners can be attributed to various factors. In 
earnings-related pension schemes based on social insurance contributions, insufficient 
pension income can result from contribution gaps or largely incomplete and insufficient 
employment biographies (due to part-time work, low wages, reduced earnings capacity, 
etc.). But one major factor for lower pension adequacy among older pensioners is insuf-
ficient pension indexation. Poverty risks are affecting especially pensioners with low 
initial pension benefits. As female pensioners tend to have lower initial pensions than 
men on average, insufficient indexation adds to the poverty risks associated with persis-
tent gender pension gaps in many EU and OECD countries (European Commission, 
2018a; OECD, 2017b). Moreover, increased poverty risks are attested for those aged 
80+ living alone, another characteristic found most often among women (OECD, 
2017b).
Against this background, this article emphasises the importance of appropriate index-
ation mechanisms for statutory pensions in payment as part of the pension promise, with 
a special focus on the objectives of different indexation mechanisms (‘Objectives of 
indexation rules’ section). The ‘Indexation parameters for pensions in payment’ section 
explores the evolution of indexation patterns, including some newly emerging factors 
and their implications. A closer look on the changes affecting indexation rules across the 
EU after the onset of the global financial crisis will shed some more light on the implica-
tions of different adjustment rules (‘Changes in European indexation rules to match the 
2008 crisis’ section). The ‘International minimum standards for pension indexation’ sec-
tion discusses possible infringement of international legal standards for the adjustment of 
pensions in payment, as set by International Labour Organisation (ILO) and Council of 
Europe instruments. The ‘Concluding remarks’ section emphasises the implications of 
different indexation mechanisms for statutory pensions in payment in the context of 
overall pension reforms, and suggests further research on the complex challenges linked 
to the provision of social security throughout retirement.
Objectives of indexation rules
From a historical perspective, the introduction of statutory indexation rules for pensions 
in payment is not a matter of course. Concerns against automatic indexation rules arose 
mainly from macroeconomic or budgetary considerations (Whitehouse, 2009). Before 
the 1970s, few public pension schemes had automatic adjustment for pensions in 
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payment. High inflation rates following the oil price crisis in the early 1970s were the 
main driver for indexation arrangements in almost all industrialised countries.
Many countries have experienced periods of dramatical decreases in purchasing 
power and a rapidly deteriorating real value of pensions in payment. Even low inflation 
rates can lead to a considerable loss in the real value of old-age pensions over a longer 
period of time. Indexation rules are thus an indispensable part of public pension policies 
supporting income maintenance and redistribution as well as alleviating poverty risks.
Although some states have relied on alternative instruments to improve the economic 
condition of old-age pensioners, such as general subsidies for basic foodstuffs, or indi-
vidual provision of benefits in kind for basic needs (e.g. in Iran),1 almost all OECD states 
seem to consent on the advantages of indexing: It is a mechanism that allows to shift 
from the political to the legal arena the decision on whether and how to raise pensions in 
payment. If there are no binding legal rules on indexing benefits in payment, adjustment 
decisions are left to the overall discretion of governments with uncertain outcomes. 
However, even when automatic indexation rules do exist, states are not prevented from 
ad hoc deviations from statutory provisions, either by reducing or suspending pension 
adjustments or by granting additional uprates to pensions in payment.
In most states, pensions are adjusted according to the two traditional indexes, either 
prices or wages, or to some combination of both (mixed or hybrid indexing). The choice 
between price and wage indexing is determined by a variety of policy objectives pursued 
for the post-employment phase, including distribution policies linked to the pension type 
in question: While basic pensions are mainly aimed at poverty alleviation, earnings-
related social insurance pensions based on past contributions may combine the objec-
tives of income replacement and protection against poverty risks. If contributory social 
insurance pensions are to be paid for a consistent part of the population, the financial 
dimension of adjustments can be considerable. For instance, the 2015 expenditure for 
annual indexation in Spain amounted to 22% of total pension expenditure (down from 
30.8% in 2008; Suárez Corujo, 2016).
Depending on the pension promise, pension indexation rules can pursue various 
goals. A first major objective is to prevent losses in purchasing power over time which is 
normally achieved through price indexing. A second objective is to allow pensioners to 
participate in rising living standards of the active population, normally achieved through 
wage indexing. As wages tend to increase faster than consumer prices (except in periods 
of massive economic downturn), wage indexing will also maintain purchasing power of 
retirees. Both indexing mechanisms serve to maintain income security in old age, albeit 
to a different extent, and help to reduce poverty risks among the very old (Schmähl, 
2010). An indexation rule that is lower than wage indexation reduces the pension benefit 
in relation to average earnings. By contrast, if average earnings shrink while inflation is 
on the rise, wage indexation would result insufficient to maintain purchasing power over 
time.
In the past decades, additional objectives have emerged that modify the effects of 
traditional indexing measures. Earnings-related pension schemes with huge differences 
in individual benefit levels may pursue redistribution objectives between high- and low-
income pensioners, by indexing high pensions at a less favourable rate than lower pen-
sions. Such degressive (or graduated) indexation arrangements are also used to avoid 
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unaffordable increases in pension expenditure. The objective of controlling pension cost 
has gained momentum in times of rapid population ageing. In this context, the objective 
of a fair sharing of financial burdens across generations, and of limiting rising contribu-
tions to pension insurance schemes, can explain the emergence of demographic and other 
sustainability factors built into the indexation arrangements.
Indexation is a forceful leverage to maintain and to improve the real value of pensions, 
which serves the overall objective of safeguarding income security in older ages. Whether 
and to what extent this objective is met will depend on how indexation rules reflect a chang-
ing economic environment, such as high inflation rates or economic downturn. Economic 
downturn producing negative developments in the chosen indexes led some countries to 
adopt special guarantee clauses. France, Italy and Germany have introduced such clauses 
that protect the nominal value of pensions in payment. However, some downward adjust-
ments have taken place in the past, for example, in Japan (Whitehouse, 2009: 20).
Indexation parameters for pensions in payment
Almost all OECD countries now have legal mechanisms in place to ensure a certain 
degree of income security during the retirement period. A pioneer in this regard is France, 
which introduced regulated indexation of existing pensions already in the late 1940s, 
followed by Germany and the Netherlands in the late 1950s (Whitehouse, 2009: 10). 
Over time, many countries have shifted from one basic parameter for indexation to 
another. The rationale underlying these changes included sociopolitical reasons for 
improving the income position of pensioners, and fiscal reasons for controlling pension 
expenditure, in particular in response to population ageing. Indexation policies also 
affect the income situation of older women relative to men. Women’s longer life expec-
tancy in combination with lower pension benefits (amounting to an average gender pen-
sion gap of about 37% across Europe) suggests that women tend to benefit more from 
adequacy-oriented indexation mechanisms.
In 1975, pension adjustment regulations existed in only 34 countries. The vast major-
ity of these countries (20) provided for price indexation, just under one-third (11) for 
wage indexation and three others for minimum wage indexation (Tracy, 1976). 
Meanwhile, a large number of European countries switched to mixed models combining 
price and wage indexation, originally introduced by Italy, Norway and Uruguay 
(McArdle, 1978). The variety of solutions reflects different social and financial policy 
priorities and objectives.
At a first glance, price and wage indexation as the traditional benchmarks may appear 
to be clear, yet in terms of their configuration in detail, complexities rapidly turn up. 
Many countries have modified the traditional benchmarks by adopting additional factors, 
conditions and alternative solutions. As analytical research on these complexities is still 
missing (Piggott and Sane, 2009), only some general implications of statutory choices in 
indexing mechanisms can be pointed out.
Price indexation
Indexing to prices relates to changes in the cost of living. This traditional benchmark, 
usually based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI), is the most frequently chosen form of 
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adjustment internationally (among others, by Australia, New Zealand, Canada, the 
United States, Israel, Korea, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico) albeit somewhat less 
by European countries (European Commission, 2018b; Mutual Information System on 
Social Protection [MISSOC], 2018; OECD, 2016: 164). In terms of fiscal burdens, price 
indexing is considered as the most economical option and a useful leverage for relieving 
the pressure of adverse demographic change on the financing of pension systems (Disney 
and Johnson, 2001). It can produce substantial savings in the long run, with relatively 
little visibility in the short term (Bonoli, 2000). However, in periods of low inflation 
price indexation may trigger declining benefit levels, with pensions lagging behind 
wages. CPI indexing thus tends to widen the gap between the actual benefits and real 
wages over the duration of retirement. As the gap gets wider the longer the retirement 
period lasts, it will affect predominantly women who are overrepresented among the eld-
est group of pensioners. Financial constraints led several European countries to switch 
from some kind of wage indexing to pure price indexation (Italy in 1992, France in 1993, 
Austria in 2004).
The design of price indexation as basic parameter also raises the question of what the 
appropriate basket of goods should contain. In practice, there are some variations linked 
to price indexing. Most countries use a single CPI that does not take into account the 
particular needs of pensioners, for example, a higher share of energy price expenditure. 
Some countries switched to a modified CPI to adjust pensions. Belgium, for example, 
excludes tobacco, alcohol and petrol, while France only excludes tobacco from the CPI 
relating to pensioners. The exclusion of these items implies an attempt towards cost sav-
ing based on moral considerations rather than on age-based consumption needs. Whether 
consumption of the elderly differs significantly from the general population is still con-
troversial and may depend also on the age, the housing condition, the availability of 
health care and other services for the elderly. A modified CPI for retired households is 
still not very common, albeit this option has gained some attraction most recently (see 
below).
Wage indexation – a rare species?
Under the assumption that earnings tend to grow faster than prices, wage growth index-
ing is usually leading to more consistent adjustment outcomes than price indexing, or 
than any mixed model. As wage indexing follows changes in living standards of the 
active population, it allows retirees to participate in productivity growth of the commu-
nity. It is usually the more costly indexation arrangement, except in times of economic 
downturn with shrinking wages, vast sectors of low-income workers and average earn-
ings lagging behind inflation.
The choice of the appropriate wage index as a benchmark for the evolution of the 
general living standards is more complicated than the price index. Most countries are 
using average wages, but there are numerous variations, including conventional wages 
(from collective agreements), means or median wages, gross or net wages, or wages 
subject to mandatory social security contributions or wages in specific sectors of the 
labour market. The implications of different options can be substantial, especially 
between gross and net wages. Indexation on gross wages is considered to be the most 
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costly and also the least fair in terms of intergenerational equity, as active workers have 
to support higher pension expenditure and will face increasing contribution rates. By 
contrast, shifting from gross to net wages implies that increases in contributions will 
automatically entail lower pension benefits, resulting in greater burden sharing between 
pensioners and active workers.
From a social policy perspective, linking basic or minimum pensions to wages is con-
sistent with the objective of poverty alleviation aimed at preventing relative poverty and 
not just mere survival. Accordingly, wage indexation is prevailing in non-contributory and 
contributory basic pension schemes: The Danish national pension (Folkepension) is 
adjusted to the increase in wages of the 2 preceding years (minus an allocation to the social 
security reserve fund if the adjustment is more than 2%); the Dutch basic pension is 
adjusted twice a year according to the average development of wages set in collective 
agreements (contract wages). Ireland is a special case as one of the few countries within the 
EU without any legislative commitment to index the contributory state pensions. But over 
many years, successive governments have agreed to increase the basic pension benefit by 
the rate of the average earnings growth (or more) in the context of annual budgets. This 
informal indexation has insured that pensioners’ living standards will not fall behind the 
general living standards of workers throughout retirement (European Commission, 2018b).
By contrast, in contributory pension schemes, the exclusive use of wage develop-
ments as the basis for pension adjustments in statutory pension insurance is an excep-
tional approach. In the EU context, wage indexation without any link to price indexation 
is currently found in employment-related pension schemes in Germany (modified by 
additional cost-mitigating factors; Roßbach, 2017), Sweden (reduced by 1.6 percentage 
points) and Norway (reduced by 0.75 percentage points). This development shows that 
even wage-based indexation is now linked explicitly to notions of sustainability, albeit 
with somewhat more emphasis on intergenerational equity. In the Netherlands, quasi-
obligatory supplementary occupational pensions are usually adjusted to wages although 
there is no legal obligation to do so. In the United Kingdom, indexation to wages is one 
of three possible options (so-called triple lock, see below). Hence, a vast majority of EU 
countries are not committed to adjust pensions in payment to increasing living standards 
in a consistent way (European Commission, 2015a: 60).
Outside the OECD area, some Latin American countries preferred wage indexation or 
comparable parameters. In Argentina, old-age insurance pensions used to be adjusted 
according to two alternative wage-related indicators (whichever parameter was more 
favourable): changes in the collection of social insurance contributions and to changes in 
the salary index of the National Statistical Office or a special wage index (the average 
wage subject to social contributions of workers) of the national social security system 
(Law No. 24.241/2009, in force up to the end of 2017; Bossio, 2014: 35; OECD, 2014: 
72).2 In Uruguay, pension indexation is based on the Median Salary Index since 1989 
(Murro, 2014: 171).
Mixed models combining price and wage indexes
Across the EU, a majority of countries have opted for mixed indexation models with 
some combination of price and wage indexation. These mixed models present huge 
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variations as to the relative weight of either index. The rationale of mixed indexation 
models is to profit from the advantages of both benchmarks while limiting their inherent 
disadvantages. A typical example is Switzerland where pensions are adjusted every 
2 years according to the arithmetic average of changes in wages and prices. To safeguard 
purchasing power, early adjustment takes place when the CPI has increased by more than 
4% in 1 year, suggesting a slight precedence of CPI growth over wage growth.
Most mixed models have deviated from the Swiss model of a 50/50 share and give 
more weight to price indexation, for example, by providing full price indexation topped 
up by some wage indexation at a reduced rate. This combination not only allows for pen-
sion adjustments above pure inflation compensation but also limits the costs of wage 
indexation, as, for instance, in Belgium (price indexation combined with ad hoc adjust-
ments to living standards by collective agreements). The indexation of most contributory 
earnings-related pensions in Europe is thus above the level of a mere price indexation, 
whereas exclusive wage indexation has lost significance (OECD, 2017a: 91).
Additional factors, elements and conditionalities in indexation 
arrangements
To a growing extent, European countries have integrated modifying factors or condition-
alities to their indexing arrangements. The underlying rationale is to limit or mitigate the 
impact of the chosen index parameter in order to support financial sustainability or inter-
generational equity of the pension scheme. This type of reform can be identified as part 
of more general retrenchment policies, associated with population ageing, but it has 
spread more visibly in the context of the 2008 crisis.
Thus, some pension schemes with a price indexation mechanism will fully adjust pen-
sions to the inflation rate (or above a certain percentage of the inflation rate) only under 
specific circumstances linked to sustainability, namely, during periods of gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth: Greece has linked indexation to 50% prices and 50% of GDP, 
limited by a maximum indexation of 100% CPI growth. Portugal’s indexation formula of 
the 2006 pension reform involves CPI inflation, real GDP growth and pension levels. If 
GDP growth is below 2%, pensions are indexed to the past 12-month-average CPI 
(excluding housing). A slightly different approach can be found in Hungary where price 
indexation (albeit calculated from a special pensioners’ consumer basket) can be topped 
up by an extra premium in years of GDP growth of more than 3.5%, under the condition 
that the state budget is in balance (European Commission, 2018b). Some countries link 
conditionality within the indexation mechanism directly to the revenue or budget of the 
pension scheme. Luxembourg, for instance, has CPI indexation, with additional increases 
if the revenues from pension insurance contributions show a surplus (Caisse Nationale 
d’Assurance Pension [CNAP], 2018: 20). Similar concerns, exacerbated by financial 
constraints resulting from the 2008 crisis, may explain the specific indexation condition-
alities linked to a balanced pension budget, as those adopted in Lithuania in 2018 
(European Commission, 2018b; Law No. 1-549 of 29 June 2016). Linking indexation to 
the sum of social insurance contributions works as a safety valve for scheme consolida-
tion, and constitutes a rather radical solution in terms of pension adequacy, as it shifts the 
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risks associated with late labour market entries, expansion of low wage sectors, precari-
ous jobs, unemployment and so on, on to the retirees.
By contrast to such cost control elements, some pension schemes have implemented 
alternative options enhancing adequacy of pensions in payment by offering ‘most-
favourable-solution’ choices. Within the EU, the United Kingdom is known for one of 
the least generous state pension systems in the developed world. Under statutory indexa-
tion rules, the basic state pension and the new state pension should be indexed at least in 
line with earnings. Based on a government commitment in budget laws, the United 
Kingdom has adopted a new model known as triple lock, providing for three variants of 
indexing pensions in payment as of 2011: The state pensions are uprated alternatively on 
CPI growth, average earnings growth or on the guaranteed minimum rate of 2.5% each 
year, whichever leads to a higher increase. Although the triple lock is not enshrined in 
law, it has considerably increased the real value of the basic state pension, especially in 
comparison with earnings (European Commission, 2018b). The motivation of this 
approach is thus to improve adequacy of state pension income.
A third modifying element in national indexation mechanisms is the differentiated 
adjustment according to pension levels. This option combines distribution policy with 
fiscal policy aspects, as the example of Italy shows. Already the Italian pension reform 
of 1975 had introduced an indexation mechanism for pensions in payment that raised 
low pensions to a proportionally greater extent than higher pensions (Klammer, 1997: 
181f.). From 1983 onwards, only pensions up to the amount of three minimum pensions 
have been indexed at the full rate, while higher pensions were indexed at a lower rate 
(90% or 75%). The differentiated rates are not only a means to redistribute pension 
income but serve also as a saving measure in light of very generous calculation rules in 
the past that account for wide differences in monthly old-age pension benefits up to the 
present: The 10 highest old-age pensions in the statutory pension insurance system in 
2013 ranged between €41,700 and €91,300 per month (European Commission, 2015b: 
162). As there is still a consistent number of so-called ‘golden pensions’, Italy has not 
only maintained a differentiated pension adjustment formula but has even refined the 
degressive graduation mechanism. Reduced indexation of higher pensions entails a gen-
eral alignment of pension levels over time and is an instrument of cost containment 
which should not affect pension adequacy. Portugal is another country that used differ-
entiated indexation rates according to pension level for contributory old-age pension, 
with more favourable rules for the lowest pensions (MISSOC, 2018; Whitehouse, 2009: 
32).
Changes in European indexation rules to match the 2008 
crisis
In times of financial crisis, many countries resort to short- or even longer term deroga-
tions from the general indexation mechanism. Suspension of regular indexation rules 
(‘freezing’ nominal pensions) or reduced (partial) indexation may result in drastic losses 
in purchasing power of pension income and risk to erode pension adequacy among older 
retirees, in particular if those measures continue over a longer period of time. Suspending 
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indexation rules in a period of crisis is not a new phenomenon but has been a common 
practice in times of economic pressure long before the 2008 crisis (Whitehouse, 2009: 
14). The changes adopted after 2008 can be divided into two types pursuing different 
objectives: (1) fiscal policy measures to consolidate pension budgets and to reduce pen-
sion expenditure, and (2) social policy measures aimed at supporting adequacy and alle-
viating poverty risks. While austerity-driven interventions prevailed in the early crisis 
period, a reversal of this tendency and even a slight shift towards more adequacy-ori-
ented solutions during the post-crisis period (2014–2017) can be noticed (European 
Commission, 2018a: 99ff.).
Temporary interventions aimed at cost containment (2009–2015)
Due to the need to increased cost containment during the economic and financial crisis, 
consolidation measures were generally prevailing up to about 2015, with a clear focus on 
limiting and/or suspending pension indexation. A total of 15 EU countries decided to 
reduce the real value of pensions through emergency measures, in general by ‘freezing’ 
pension benefits in payment or by partially limiting the standard indexation mechanism, 
including Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Finland, France, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden (European 
Commission, 2015a: 176). In times of severe budgetary constraints, policy makers often 
rely on such interventions in order to achieve rapid short-term savings in pension expend-
iture. The volume of savings in pension expenditure can be significant, while the effects 
on purchasing power become visible only in the long run. At any rate, non-adjustment of 
pensions in payment is less intrusive and often less controversial than direct cuts to the 
nominal value of pensions in payment.
However, many EU countries were constrained to adopt extended ‘freezing periods’ 
that lasted for more than 2 years, for example, Latvia 2009–2013, Greece 2010–2014, 
Romania 2010–2012, Portugal 2011–2015 (European Commission, 2018a; Hinrichs, 
2015). The adequacy of pension levels for older pensioners may be seriously hampered 
in case of protracted temporary suspension of the ‘normal rules’ of pension indexation 
(European Commission, 2018b).
Emergency interventions that continue for several years undermine the pension prom-
ise. Moreover, they bear the risk that pensioners seek judicial redress. Frequent repetition 
of cutting or limiting pension adjustments can be at odds with constitutional law as in the 
case of Italy with its long tradition of restricting pension adjustments (cf. Corte 
Costituzionale No. 316/2010). While previous cuts affected only better-off retirees, the 
2011 pension reform adopted a more drastic suspension of pension adjustments, which 
exempted only pensions up to three times the minimum pension (gross pension of about 
€1400). The Italian Constitutional Court ruled that this massive cut was unconstitutional 
and called on the government to pay the withheld adjustments (Judgement No. 70 of 30 
April 2015). Due to financial constraints, the Italian legislature granted only partial relief 
which left some pensioners without indexation (Decreto Legge No. 65/2015), yet further 
court actions in Italy remained unsuccessful (Judgement No. 250 of 25 October 2017; 
Ordinanza No. 96 of 11 May 2018). In 2018, a trade union for retirees lodged a collective 
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complaint before the European Committee of Social Rights alleging violation of the 
European Social Charter [ESC] (Complaint No. 167/2018).
As of 2015, many EU countries became aware that indexation suspension and less 
favourable indexation formula during the economic crisis had contributed to a persistent 
decline in the real value of pensions. Several countries therefore lifted the freeze on pen-
sion indexation, granted ad hoc payments to compensate for the losses in pension income 
or took other measures to reverse or mitigate a negative impact of cutbacks on indexation 
rules: While the regular adjustment would have led to a pension reduction of 3.5% in 
Sweden, the government could avoid most of the benefit cuts by partially reducing taxes 
on pension benefits in 2010 (European Commission, 2015a: 176). France had reduced 
the pension adjustment by lowering the relevant CPI (deduction of 1 percentage point), 
but introduced a clause to protect the nominal value of the pension benefits in payment 
(OECD, 2017a: 34). The Slovak Republic used a higher adjustment rate of 2% in 2017 
instead of the regular indexation, the latter of which would only have resulted in an 
increase of 0.3% (OECD, 2017a: 25). Extraordinary uprating to compensate the loss of 
purchase power has been practised, for example, by Bulgaria in 2013, Portugal in 2017 
and Slovenia in 2016/2017 (European Commission, 2018b).
Shifting towards less generous indexation rules
In the post-crisis period since 2015, states have been resorting also to permanent changes 
instead of temporary interventions. In several cases, this implied a shift towards less 
generous indexing options.
A variety of such austerity-oriented reforms to indexation arrangements can be found 
across the EU: From 2016 onwards, Italy introduced new calculation modalities for the 
degressive indexation of higher pension benefits. While the traditional degressive adjust-
ment rates had been applied only to the corresponding pension bands, the revised rules 
extended degressive adjustment rates to the whole monthly pension amounts exceeding 
a certain income limit: While modest pensions up to three times the minimum pension 
continue to be adjusted to 100%, higher pensions are indexed only in part – for instance, 
at rates descending in four steps from 95% to 45% in 2018, and in six steps from 97% to 
40% (the latter rate being applied to pensions of more than nine times the minimum pen-
sion, €) as of 2019. Due to the low inflation rate in 2017–2018, the staggered indexation 
measures had not impacted pension levels significantly, but most recent reforms for 2019 
have increased the differentiation according to pension level.
Other countries, too, tended to downsize indexation over time: Finland had switched 
from wage indexation to a mixed model already by 1978, later changing from a 50%/50% 
weight to 80% of CPI and 20% of wage growth. In the wake of the 2008 crisis, Finland 
further reduced the indexation rate for work-related pensions to 0.4% (instead of previ-
ously well over 1%) of the basic parameter (European Commission, 2015b: 329). France 
has postponed the date of the annual adjustment from April to October (OECD, 2017a) 
and shifted to an under-indexation – 1% below the inflation rate – in occupational pen-
sion schemes, based on the inter-professional agreement of October 2015 (European 
Commission, 2018b). Slovakia is shifting from a mixed indexation model to a less 
favourable price indexation as of 2018, albeit mitigated by some minimum adjustment 
guarantees (European Commission, 2018b). The 2013 pension reform of Slovenia shifted 
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indexation from wage growth to a less generous mixed model (60% of salary growth and 
40% of price increases), but further reform proposals point towards mere inflation com-
pensation (Macjen, 2016) which will exclude pensioners from increasing living stand-
ards. In Greece – the EU country most heavily exposed to external pressure from 
international economic organisations – current and future pensioners have to face drastic 
cuts in pension income, including a permanent retrenchment in indexation rules in 2016, 
after several temporary cuts (European Commission, 2018b; MISSOC, 2018): The 
reform introduced new indexation rules for primary pensions in payment, which will 
become effective as of January 2022. Annual indexation is based on a coefficient, 50% 
of which is determined by the variation of GDP and 50% by the variation in the CPI of 
the preceding year, but the variation in CPI may not be exceeded (Art. 14, Para. 3a, Act 
No. 4387/2016). In addition, pensions are adjusted every 3 years under the condition that 
long-term sustainability of the social security system is ensured (Art. 14, Para. 4, Act No. 
4387/2016). Moreover, indexation of supplementary pensions under the National Social 
Security System (financed exclusively by contributions) is suspended at nominal values 
until 2021, while future adjustments will be precluded if the balance between expenses 
and revenue of the pension fund is negative or less than 0.5% of contributions (Law No. 
4336/2015). The limitations inherent in setting the CPI as the maximum level for the 
standard indexation while linking additional increments to a conditionality test empha-
sise the overall focus on sustainability, which is also underpinned by various direct cuts 
for all pensions in payment (of up to 18%) as of January 2019 (European Commission, 
2018b). Finally, Romania has adopted legislation to shift from the current mixed model 
(100% of average inflation rate and in addition 50% of the real growth of the average 
gross salary) to a less generous indexation, only in line with prices by 2030.
In 2013, Spain experienced a hard downward shift in pension indexation rules by 
linking indexing to severe conditionalities of financial sustainability, as part of a compre-
hensive pension retrenchment reform (Act No. 23/2013 of 23 December 2013). The 
reform involved a complete departure from the traditional price indexing that had been 
introduced after the years of high inflation in the 1990s. The 2013 reform created a new 
pension adjustment index sui generis. The adjustment was limited by a minimum of 
0.25% and a maximum of 0.5% of the CPI (Suárez Corujo, 2014: 293f.). The new for-
mula abolished the goal of maintaining the purchasing power, and made indexation con-
ditional on the financial stability of the pension system instead. According to estimates, 
the revised pension adjustment index would have led to an 11% decline in pension ben-
efit levels over the course of a decade (Suárez Corujo, 2017: 97) and to shrinking replace-
ment rates (European Commission, 2018b: 92). In 2014–2017, a substantial loss of 
purchasing power was prevented due to a very low inflation rate. However, in 2018, 
pensioners were granted additional increments (amounting to 2.75% for minimum pen-
sions and 1.35% for other pensions). Moreover, the new government elected in 2018 
decided to correct the 2013 adjustment formula in order to safeguard purchasing power 
of pensioners and to avoid poverty risks among older pensioners.
Shifting towards more adequacy-oriented indexation rules
Meanwhile, several countries have shifted towards post-crisis improvements in indexa-
tion regulations aimed at counterbalancing sustainability-driven measures. A very 
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cautious measure to this end was the introduction of a guaranteed minimum flat-rate 
indexation in Slovakia, so that pensions in payment can be increased either on the infla-
tion affecting pensioner households or by a given fixed amount (European Commission, 
2018b). The Czech Republic chose to adopt a series of subtle adequacy-oriented meas-
ures in 2016–2017 to improve income adequacy at older ages (European Commission, 
2018b). The first change allowed the government to top up existing pensions if the regu-
lar indexation formula would increase pensions by less than 2.7%. A second change 
provided for a most favourable solution approach regarding the basket of goods to be 
considered for price indexation: It can be based either on the increase in consumer prices 
for households of pensioners or on the increase in consumer prices of all households, 
whichever is higher. The last change approved in 2017 introduced a stronger link to wage 
development within the mixed formula: The wage-related parameter has been upgraded 
to a 50% rate of real wage growth (instead of previously only 33% of wage growth). This 
last reform should mitigate an expected drop in the replacement rate of almost 5 percent-
age points by 2030 and thus help to prevent increasing poverty rates among pensioners 
(European Commission, 2018b; Prague Daily Monitor, 28 July 2017).
More or less subtle improvements in the adjustment formula have been adopted in 
several other Eastern European countries. An interesting novelty is the emergence of a 
‘most favourable solution’ principle. This principle can be found regarding the selection 
of the relevant price index (general CPI or special CPI for pensioners) as in the Czech 
Republic or in Poland. The principle is also used for selecting the weight of indexing 
parameters in mixed indexation models: Croatia introduced a new variable formula for 
biannual adjustments in which the variation of prices and wages is taken into account in 
different proportions of 70:30, 50:50 or 30:70, whichever is more favourable (European 
Commission, 2018a; MISSOC, 2018). Resorting to a ‘most favourable solution’ approach 
indicates a rebalancing between adequacy and financial sustainability in pension policy. 
Another way to enhance adequacy is to strengthen the role of real wage growth within a 
mixed indexation model, an option followed by Latvia as of 2018: It combined in a 
mixed model CPI and an increase of the normal rate of wage indexing of 0.5% of real 
wage growth, with more beneficial rules for pensioners with longer insurance periods 
(0.7% for pensioners with 40 or more years, 0.6% for pensioners with 30–39 years of 
insurance or arduous work record).
International minimum standards for pension indexation
As the overall tendency of pension reforms across Europe is still towards retrenchment, 
the issue arises as to whether international legal standards enshrined in ILO and Council 
of Europe conventions could be infringed.
International and European legal framework
The first minimum standards for old-age provision, including the upgrading of periodic 
payments, were set by ILO Convention No. 102 (1952) on Minimum Standards of Social 
Security. Twenty-two of the current EU member states (including Great Britain) ratified 
this instrument, in force internationally as of 1955. The Baltic States, Malta and Hungary 
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did not join. A total of eight EU member states as well as Norway and Switzerland 
acceded to the more specific Convention No. 128 (1967) on Invalidity, Old-Age and 
Survivors’ Benefits, which contains stricter minimum standards.
In the European context, the minimum social security standards developed within the 
Council of Europe are more relevant. The most important Council of Europe convention 
on this subject is the European Code of Social Security (ECSS) of 16 April 1964, which 
replicated the minimum standards laid down in the ILO Conventions. A total of 18 EU 
member states (including Estonia), plus Norway, Switzerland and Turkey, have ratified 
the ECSS, while Austria, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia as well as Moldova and Ukraine 
have signed but not ratified this treaty. The ECSS is supplemented by an Additional 
Protocol of 16 April 1964 providing for higher protection standards. Six EU member 
states (Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden) and 
Norway joined the 1964 Protocol by ratification, whereas another five EU countries have 
signed it without ratification. Latvia adhered to the ECSS minimum standards by ratify-
ing the revised ESC of 1996, a human rights instrument of the Council of Europe which 
links the right to social security to the ECSS standards (Art. 12(2) ESC). Lithuania, 
Malta and Hungary are the only EU member states that have not committed to any inter-
national minimum standards for old-age pensions.
Minimum standards of the conventions
Two minimum standards are relevant with regard to the indexation of old-age pensions: 
The standards for social security in old age are set out in Part V (Art. 25ff.), in Part XI 
(Art. 65ff.) and in the table following Part XI (Dijkhoff, 2011): First, a minimum rate of 
benefits is fixed as a percentage or total wage in respect of the contingency of old age for 
a so-called ‘standard beneficiary’. In the case of old-age pensions, the standard benefi-
ciary means a male insuree with a (dependent) wife of retirement age. If the national 
pension system provides for individualised pension entitlements, a proportional adjust-
ment of the minimum standard can be made. To assess whether the required standard of 
living is guaranteed, the conventions envisage various calculation models that are based 
on different national models of statutory provision for old age: In the case of social secu-
rity schemes for employees or gainfully employed persons, the determination is based on 
the previous earnings of the beneficiary, on the wage of a skilled male worker, or on the 
average earnings in the territory of the respective state. The benefit must be at least equal 
to the fixed percentage of the gross salary of a standard pensioner within the meaning of 
the conventions. For old-age pensions, this minimum level has been fixed at 40% of the 
reference value (45% under the Additional Protocol). For the assessment of compliance, 
the benefit rate does not only apply to the initial old-age pension but must be guaranteed 
throughout retirement (Art. 30 ECSS). As regards the provision of long-term benefits, 
the ECSS requires only that the rates of old-age pensions and other types of pensions are 
to be reviewed following “substantial changes in the general level of earnings where 
these result from substantial changes in the cost of living” (Art. 65 (10) ECSS; also ILO 
C102). The standard does not prescribe any automatic indexation arrangement, nor any 
specific method, but points out two changing parameters that need to be kept in mind: the 
general development of wages (earnings) and the cost of living (prices). This is a very 
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soft provision, which leaves a wide margin of discretion to the states. It reflects the his-
toric context of the conventions: At the time when the minimum standards were pre-
pared, indexation as automatic adjustment of pensions in payment was still rather 
uncommon.
Another requirement relates to the period for the calculation of the reference value 
and the calculation of the benefit: Both must be calculated on the same time basis (Art. 
65(4) ECSS) as time lags will entail reduced adjustments. In practice, some European 
countries do not take sufficient account of this requirement and resort to time lags also as 
a cost saving measure (for Estonia and the Czech Republic, see Dijkhoff, 2011).
Given the prevailing reform trends in the adjustment of pensions in payment, in most 
cases there does not seem to be, at first glance, any infringement in relation to the inter-
national minimum standards, as they provide for a rather low replacement level for old-
age pensions. However, a problematic constellation could arise due to the following 
aspects: First, the stronger shift towards price indexation (or less than price indexation as 
in Spain) could lead to the reference value of 40% (or 45% if the higher standard is appli-
cable) being undercut at some point during the retirement period, particularly in the case 
of a low entry pension level. This problem has increased over time due to the general 
decline in initial pensions induced by sustainability-driven pension reforms combined 
with additional austerity measures after the 2008 global economic and financial crisis. 
Second, the use of different time bases to determine the benefit adjustment and the cal-
culation of the index values, too, can undermine the minimum level of pensions in pay-
ment to be guaranteed. Third, measures adopted in the wake of the 2008 crisis, such as a 
multiple suspension of pensions in payment, should be viewed critically as they could 
entail a cumulation of downsizing effects on the replacement rate to be guaranteed. 
Particularly problematic are indexation rules that are neither geared to price nor to wage 
developments, and therefore obviously do not guarantee the minimum standards of the 
ECSS.
Concluding remarks
Indexing of pensions is a pension design feature directly affecting income security at 
older ages, with important social policy and fiscal policy implications. While govern-
ments and international economic organisations have been ready to capture the saving 
potential of indexation mechanisms, the impact of this instrument on pension adequacy 
is rarely dealt with. The need to safeguard and maintain income security throughout the 
entire retirement phase has been recognised in ILO Conventions as early as 1952 and 
later in European Council conventions on minimum standards for social security. 
Reforms of adjustment parameters should bear in mind these international minimum 
standards instruments. Although the standards are not very ambitious, reduced first pen-
sion payment levels in combination with indexation rules neglecting adequacy could 
entail non-compliance with international minimum standards at some point of time. In 
the contemporary context of cutting down on pension levels for new pensioners, the risk 
of non-compliance in terms of indexation arrangements should therefore be taken more 
seriously by policy makers.
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Indexation rules have been frequently revised in the course of the past decades. In the 
wake of the 2008 economic and financial crisis, diversified normative patterns of indexa-
tion have emerged across the EU. On one hand, a consistent part of the revisions to 
indexing parameters implied a shift towards less generous indexation rules, in line with 
general pension retrenchment objectives aimed at cost containment. Repeated adjust-
ment moratoria, partial indexation and the introduction of modifying factors and condi-
tionalities are used to save a significant part of public funds without reducing nominal 
pension values. Such interventions are seen as less intrusive and generally provoke less 
resistance than direct benefit cuts. On the other hand, some of the recent reforms have 
used the leverage of indexation to improve the real value of pensions and overall pension 
adequacy during retirement. These more subtle improvements reflect a slight reversal 
from the previous sustainability-driven reform initiatives: They seek to avoid or mitigate 
pension erosion, and recognise that indexation represents a key element of the right to 
pension as a social security right.
Numerous austerity-driven interventions in pension systems have raised the issue of 
cumulative negative effects in reducing entry pension levels and restricting adjustment 
of pensions in payment over time. The overall emphasis on financial sustainability has 
largely neglected increasing risks of poverty and social exclusion among the very old – a 
social group of high vulnerability, predominantly women. It is therefore paramount to 
consider indexation as leverage for improving adequacy and income security among 
older pensioners. Adequate indexation will become even more important in coming dec-
ades as a consequence of fundamental changes in the labour market, with a growing 
number of shorter, discontinuous and non-standard employment biographies, entailing 
lower social insurance contributions and smaller pension entitlements. In view of grow-
ing inequalities in labour market participation, pension reforms should strive to consider 
more adequacy-oriented solutions within indexation arrangements, including redistribu-
tive elements and best solution alternatives.
Conditionality factors linked to indexation are a recent phenomenon that needs fur-
ther study, in particular as to the interaction with feedback elements linking pensions to 
longevity changes. The idea of sharing the burdens of pension expenditure in contribu-
tory systems between pension recipients and the active generation is based apparently on 
equity considerations. However, it is difficult to assess whether it serves to establish a 
fair balance between financial and social sustainability with public pension schemes, or 
whether it is just another means to justify pension retrenchment policies. Recent inter-
ventions in indexation mechanisms have contributed to increase complexities and to 
diminish transparency of indexation rules across Europe. Further research is thus needed 
to understand the impact of these complexities in light of the combined challenges stem-
ming from population ageing, labour market transformations and the legal standards to 
be guaranteed.
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Notes
1. In Iran, certain civil servants received a generous monthly ration of sugar and wheat in addi-
tion to their pensions, which could be sold if they did not use it for their personal consump-
tion, thereby increasing the disposable income of the household.
2. Until the Act on Indexation No. 26.417/2008 (Ley de Movilidad) was passed, no automatic 
pension adjustments took place for one entire decade. In an unprecedented wave of lawsuits, 
pensioners successfully claimed their right to pension indexation, but the controversies sur-
rounding the additional payments owed continued over another decade. Since 2018, a mixed 
system consisting of 70% of price developments and 30% of average wage developments 
in the formal sector has been in force (Law No. 27.426/2017). The intention to curb pen-
sion expenditure can be derived from the much lower proportion of wage indexation and the 
deferred adjustment lagging behind the index changes by 6 months instead of 3 months as 
before.
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